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Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed
earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. The players are
located either on square lattices or random regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player
reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner strategy efficiently prevents suc-
cessful spreading of selfish, defective behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square
lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the cyclic dominance, whereas on
random regular graphs different types of oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines
whether damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared to predictions by pair ap-
proximation. Although pair approximation is incapable of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal
connectivity, the average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are well reproduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDG) [1, 2, 3, 4,
5] were introduced to study the emergence and maintenance
of cooperation among selfish individuals in societies where
strategies are either inherited or adopted through basic imi-
tation rules. In the original PDG [6] two players simultane-
ously decide whether to cooperate or defect. Mutual cooper-
ation (defection) yields the highest (lowest) collective payoff
which is shared equally. However, still higher individual pay-
offs are achieved by defectors facing cooperators leaving the
latter with the lowest possible payoff. Thus, defection is dom-
inant because they fare better (or at least equal) regardless of
the co-players decision. Consequentially, ’rational’ players al-
ways end up with the lowest collective payoff instead of the
higher reward for mutual cooperation.
Obviously, this result is at odds with observations in hu-
man and animal societies. Indeed, cooperation may emerge
under certain circumstances (see e.g. [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]). In
well-mixed populations, i.e. with random matchings, cooper-
ative strategies succeed provided that interactions between the
same individuals are repeated with sufficiently high probabil-
ity. Computer tournaments [4, 13] emphasized the importance
of particularly simple strategies such as D (always defect), C
(always cooperate), and T (”tit for tat”, cooperate on the first
move and then repeat the co-player’s move).
In spatially extended systems with limited local interac-
tion, cooperators may thrive by forming clusters [11, 14, 15]
and thereby reducing exploitation by defectors. For exam-
ple, on square lattices with C, D strategies and suitable pa-
rameter values, clusters of cooperators typically expand along
straight boundaries while being invaded by defectors along
corners and irregular boundaries. The competition between
these two invasion processes maintains persistent co-existence
of both strategies. When tuning the model parameters, univer-
sal phase transitions between states of homogenous defection,
co-existence and mutual cooperation are observed [16, 17].
Very recently the analysis is extended to diluted lattices [18]
and to adaptive networks [19].
The dynamics of such spatial evolutionary PDG becomes
increasingly complex if players can adopt three or more strate-
gies [20, 21, 22]. In particular, the crucial role of the T
strategy is confirmed [23, 24]. For example, in an externally
driven system supplying C, i.e. nourishing defectors, coop-
erative behavior persists through the cyclic dominance of D,
C, and T which maintains self-organizing domain structures
[25, 26, 27].
In this work, we consider another PDG with three strategies
by allowing for optional participation. Players can adopt the
C and D strategies mentioned above or decline participation
relying on some small but fixed source of income. Such risk
averse players are termed loners (L).
Voluntary participation in public goods games [10, 28]
turned out to be an efficient way to prevent and avoid the
tragedy of the commons [29]. This system has an inherent
cyclic dominance resulting in periodic oscillations in well-
mixed populations [30] and self-organizing polydomain struc-
tures on square lattices [31]. However note that the former
case requires group sizes larger than pairs i.e. excluding the
PDG. Pairwise interactions invariably lead to homogenous
states of loners. In sharp contrast, we demonstrate that co-
operative behavior persists on square lattices producing self-
organizing patterns whereas varying types of oscillations oc-
cur on random regular graphs (RRG) emphasizing the impor-
tance of topological characteristics. RRGs represent a natu-
ral choice for social networks relevant in human behavior as
well as economic interactions where the geometrical location
hardly matters.
II. THE MODELS
We consider the evolutionary PDG in large populations
with N players in the limit N → ∞ for different geome-
2tries: First, we briefly review the results for well-mixed popu-
lations i.e. the mean-field approximation. Second, the players
are arranged on a square lattice and interact only with their
four nearest neighbors to the north, east, south and west. Fi-
nally, the players are located on a RRG with fixed connectiv-
ity (z = 4) excluding double or self-connectivities. There-
fore, each player has the same number of neighbors as its
counterpart on the square lattice. Note that locally a RRG
is similar to a tree (or Bethe-lattice) because the average loop
size increases with N [32]. Since boundary problems render
Bethe-lattices unsuitable for Monte Carlo (MC) simulations,
RRGs serve as suitable substitutes. In addition, the analysis of
branching annihilating random walks has justified the validity
of pair approximation on RRG [33].
Each player follows one of three strategies, namely de-
fection D, cooperation C, and loner L, denoted by a three-
component unit vector:
s(x) =
(
1
0
0
)
,
(
0
1
0
)
,
(
0
0
1
)
. (1)
The total payoff m(x) for the player located on site x is spec-
ified by
m(x) =
∑
δ
sT (x)M · s(x+ δ), (2)
where sT (x) denotes the transpose of s(x) and the summa-
tion runs over the four nearest neighbors (δ) as defined by the
geometry under consideration. Following [11], the payoff ma-
trix M is given by
M =
(
0 b σ
0 1 σ
σ σ σ
)
, (3)
where b (1 < b < 2) determines the temptation to defect.
Loners and their co-players invariably obtain the fixed payoff
0 < σ < 1, i.e. they perform better than two defectors but are
worse off than cooperative pairs.
Randomly chosen players are allowed to reassess and mod-
ify their strategy. For example, the player at site x adopts the
strategy of one of its (randomly chosen) neighbors y with a
probability
W [s(x)← s(y)] =
1
1 + exp [(m(x)−m(y))/K]
, (4)
where K introduces some noise that occasionally leads to ir-
rational decisions.
The imitation rule or learning mechanism (4) leads to three
trivial unstable fixed points, namely the homogenous C, D
andL states. The highest average payoff (mc = 4) is achieved
if everybody cooperates but this state is vulnerable to exploita-
tion. For sufficiently large b the appearance of a single defec-
tor suffices for cooperation to break down. The system then
evolves into a homogenous D state with the lowest average
payoff (md = 0). Loners may in turn invade this state and
L C
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FIG. 1: Time evolution of states in mean-field approximation for
b = 1.5, K = 0.1 and σ = 0.3.
thereby provide an escape hatch out of states of mutual defec-
tion. Eventually a homogenousL state is reached with an av-
erage payoff ml = 4σ. Note that solitary defectors are elim-
inated by noise. Finally, the loop is closed by noting that if
no one participates in the PDG, cooperators may thrive again.
However, also note that this requires the presence of at least
two cooperators. This cyclic rock-scissors-paper type domi-
nance determines the system’s dynamics over a wide parame-
ter range.
III. MEAN-FIELD AND PAIR APPROXIMATIONS
In the classical mean-field approximation, i.e. in well-
mixed populations, this system is described by the (time-
dependent) frequencies fi(t) of the three strategies with
fC(t) + fD(t) + fL(t) = 1 [20, 30]. Figure 1 displays the
time evolution on a ternary phase diagram.
Regardless of the initial configuration, the system always
approaches the homogenous L state. This result is robust
against changes in the parameter values. The heteroclinic cy-
cle along the boundary of the simplex S3 reflects the cyclic
dominance of the strategies. Mean-field approximations ne-
glect spatial structures, i.e. they describe individuals with an
infinite range of interactions or situations where co-players are
randomly chosen.
In contrast, pair approximation is capable of capturing
some relevant effects occurring for lasting (fixed) partnership.
The frequency of strategies is determined by two-site or pair
configuration probabilities (for an introduction see e.g. [34]).
The probability of a strategy change depends on the configu-
ration of an eight-site cluster consisting of the randomly cho-
sen player, one of its randomly chosen neighbors (the pair)
and their six nearest neighbors. Configuration probabilities of
larger clusters are assumed to be products of the correspond-
ing pair configuration probabilities. Due to the same connec-
3L C
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FIG. 2: Different trajectories as predicted by pair approximation:
(a) for b = 1.03 (solid line) loners go extinct and only D and C
survive and co-exist in a stationary state. (b) all the three strategies
coexist for b = 1.2 (dotted line). (c) for b = 1.5 the limit cycle is
shown (dashed line). The bullet indicates the unstable interior fixed
point. (d) the trajectory spirals towards the boundary of the simplex
(b = 1.9).
tivity z = 4 of the square lattice and the chosen RRG, the two
structures are indistinguishable by pair approximation.
The following systematic analysis is restricted to the case
of σ = 0.3 and K = 0.1. Figure 2 shows four typical tra-
jectories for different values of the temptation to defect b.
For very small b (1 < b < b(p)0 = 1.0485(1)) the cluster-
ing advantage of cooperators suffices to offset exploitation
by defectors. Loners are unable to provide a viable alterna-
tive and vanish. The ratio of D and C in the stationary state
depends on the parameters b, σ, and K . When increasing b
(b(p)0 < b < b(p)1 = 1.4670(3)), a stable interior fixed point ap-
pears, i.e. all trajectories approach this stationary value where
all three strategies co-exist. For b > b(p)1 periodic oscillations
appear. Both, the amplitude and the period increase with b.
In finite populations with b > b(p)2 ≃ 1.85 any strategy may
go extinct due to noise and the trajectory ends in one of the
absorbing homogenous states. Note that in this case the rig-
orous numerical analysis becomes difficult because of the ex-
tremely low configuration probabilities occurring during the
oscillations.
IV. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
MC simulations are performed on square lattices and on
RRGs. In both cases the runs are started from random ini-
tial states. Frequencies and payoffs of all three strategies are
traced over time. After an appropriate relaxation time the av-
erage frequencies and payoffs are determined (sampling times
varied from 104 to 105 MC steps per site).
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FIG. 3: Average frequency of defectors (squares), cooperators (dia-
monds), and loners (triangles) as a function of b for K = 0.1 and
σ = 0.3 on square lattices. The solid (dashed) lines show the stable
(unstable) stationary values predicted by pair approximation.
The linear extension of the square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions was 400 sites for most MC simulations.
However, in the vicinity of transition points the system size
was increased to up to 800 sites in order to suppress undesired
diverging fluctuations.
The simulations confirm that loners die out for small b <
b
(sq)
0 = 1.0262(1). In fact, since loners invade the territory of
defectors, they can only survive if the frequency of defectors
exceeds a threshold value. Note that in the vicinity of the
transition point, the pair approximation predicts slightly lower
defector frequencies and therefore a higher threshold value.
The frequency of loners vanishes continuously when de-
creasing b → b(sq)0 . The numerical analysis of MC data sug-
gests that this extinction process belongs to the directed per-
colation universality class [34, 35]. Related critical transitions
were reported and discussed in [16, 17, 28]. In contrast to
this non-analytical transition, the pair approximation predicts
a mean-field type behavior, i.e. the frequency of loners van-
ishes linearly with b− b(p)0 .
For b > b(sq)0 the frequency of loners (defectors) increases
(decreases) monotonously with b. However note that the oscil-
latory behavior predicted by pair approximation is absent on
square lattices. The time evolution of the lattice shows cyclic
invasions for any site but the phases of these local oscilla-
tions are not synchronized [31]. Instead, the cyclic invasion
sustains a self-organizing poly-domain structure. Similar pat-
terns are observed for spatial rock-scissors-paper games (see
e.g. [24, 25, 27]).
To illustrate the striking difference between the results ob-
tained on square lattices and RRG, we compare two trajecto-
ries determined by MC simulations for the same model pa-
rameters (see Fig. 4). On square lattices the trajectory evolves
towards a stable interior fixed point. In contrast, on RRG the
trajectory approaches a periodic limit cycle. Note that for such
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FIG. 4: Time evolution of strategy frequencies according to MC sim-
ulations for b = 1.5, σ = 0.3, and K = 0.1. The solid line shows
the trajectory on a square lattice with 600 × 600 sites. The dashed
line indicates the limit cycle on a RRG with N = 5 · 105 sites.
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FIG. 5: Average frequency of defectors versus temptation b obtained
by MC simulations (closed squares) on RRG and by pair approxi-
mation (solid line). The minimum and maximum frequency of D is
indicated by open symbols (simulations) and dashed lines (pair ap-
proximation).
large system sizes, the noise amplitude is comparable to the
line width. The oscillatory behavior is very similar to the pre-
dictions by pair approximation (see Fig. 2). Moreover, the
amplitude again increases with b. To demonstrate this nice
agreement, the average, minimal and maximal frequencies of
defectors are depicted in Fig. 5. The MC data is obtained by
averaging over 104 MC steps per sites after suitable relaxation
times for N = 106 sites. In absence of periodic oscillations,
the difference between the minimum and maximum values
increases very slowly with b until for b = brrg1 = 1.485(1)
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FIG. 6: Average frequencies of defectors (squares), cooperators (di-
amonds), and loners (triangles) as a function of b for σ = 0.3 and
K = 0.1 on RRG. The solid and dashed lines show the stable and
unstable predictions of pair approximation.
a Hopf-bifurcation occurs. For b > b1 the extremal values
quickly separate from the average value reflecting the oscil-
lating behavior in close agreement with pair approximation.
Simulations for b > b(rrg)2 ≃ 1.82 confirm another predic-
tion of pair approximation: in finite populations, oscillations
with increasing amplitudes are eventually stopped by the ex-
tinction of either one of the strategies and the system ends up
in the respective homogenous absorbing state. This means if
cooperators are to die out first, the systems evolves into a state
with all loners. Obviously any strategy may disappear first but
the probabilities depend on the parameters, the initial config-
uration and the system size. For example, about 87% (13%)
of randomly initialized runs lead to a homogeneous loner (de-
fector) state for b = 1.8 and N = 106.
On RRG the results of MC simulations are well described
by pair approximation as illustrated in Fig. 6. For such struc-
tures, the extinction of loners is expected to be a mean-field
type process [33]. Rigorous analysis of our MC data con-
firms that loners indeed vanish linearly with b − b(rrg)0 where
b
(rrg)
0 = 1.03858(3).
In the region of coexistence (b(rrg)0 < b < b(rrg)2 )
the frequency of loners (defectors) increases (decreases)
monotonously with b. But note that the cooperator frequency
in MC simulations slightly increases in the oscillating region
(b(rrg)1 < b < b(rrg)2 ). The dashed lines in Fig. 6 represent the
unstable stationary solution of pair approximation meanwhile
the symbols are determined by averaging over more than 300
cycles in the MC simulations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The present investigations confirm that voluntary participa-
tion in PDG interactions is capable of preventing ”the tragedy
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FIG. 7: Average payoff of cooperators (diamonds) and defectors
(squares) as well as the average population payoff (circles) a func-
tion of b for K = 0.1 and σ = 0.3. The dashed line indicates the
loners (fixed) income σ and the dotted line shows the maximal pay-
off available for uniform cooperation. Closed (open) symbols refer
to MC simulations on RRG (square lattice).
of the commons” and efficiently avoids states of mutual defec-
tion. Introducing the loner strategy gives rise to a cyclic dom-
inance that can maintain the co-existence of all three strate-
gies. With players arranged on a square lattice, the cyclic
invasions maintain a self-organizing three-color pattern. In
contrast, different types of oscillations in the frequencies of
the strategies are observed if players are located on a RRG.
Both scenarios have the same connectivity z = 4, i.e. the
players invariably interact with four neighbors. Occasionally
players reassess their strategy by sampling their neighborhood
and switch strategy with a probability depending on the payoff
difference.
From the view point of sociology (or behavioral sciences)
the most relevant questions refer to the average individual in-
come of defectors, cooperators, and loners. Figure 7 clearly
illustrates that spatial extension promotes cooperation. The
average payoff of cooperators is significantly higher than that
of defectors but more importantly, the average population pay-
off is larger than the loners income σ. This means that the
possibility to participate in the PDG has a positive net return
for the population. At the same time it remains far below the
maximum mc = 4 leaving room for further strategical im-
provements.
Comparing the results for square lattices and RRG, we note
that the average payoff of cooperators, and even more pro-
nounced the average population payoff, turns out to be sig-
nificantly lower on RRG. Due to the randomly drawn links
between the players, cluster formation becomes more difficult
while facilitating exploitation. But recall that in absence of
spatial structures, only loners survive and forego the chances
of the PDG. Similarly, for a sufficiently high temptation to de-
fect (b > b2) the oscillations on RRG usually terminate in the
absorbing state of all loners (see above).
In this work we investigate effects of the underlying geom-
etry on the success of cooperative strategies by comparing the
game dynamics on square lattices and RRG with equal con-
nectivity. These two structures are indistinguishable at the
level of pair approximation. However, MC simulations re-
veal significant qualitative differences arising from the distinct
topologies. At the same time, pair approximation turned out
to reproduce a detailed picture of the MC results obtained on
RRG.
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